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United States Policy Toward Foreign
Commodity Markets: A Critique
John V. Rainboit*
I. INTRODUCTION
New trading instruments and a concommitant increase in volume
in United States futures markets during the past decade has overshad-
owed somewhat a parallel market expansion involving foreign com-
modity exchanges serving an expanded United States and international
customer base.
Such trading centers as the London Metal Exchange and the ter-
minal markets of the London Commodity Exchange have long played
a key role in providing hedging and pricing facilities for world trade.
Contemporary foreign commodity exchanges also list financial fu-
tures,' offer markets in petroleum products, 2 and potentially include
offshore markets listing United States based futures contracts, as well
as "branch" foreign exchanges linked to United States markets which
allow offset of a domestic position by a foreign position, and vice versa.
The various attractions of these markets has resulted in growing
* Partner, Miles & Stockbridge, Washington, D.C.; Member, District of Columbia and
Oklahoma Bars. The Author has served as Commissioner (Vice Chairman) of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (1975-1978), as Majority Counsel of the Committee on Agriculture,
United States House of Representatives (1973-1975), and also as a Member, GATT Agricultural
Policy Advisory Committee (1978-1979). He is currently Chairman of the Subcommittee on For-
eign Traders and Foreign Markets of the American Bar Association Committee on Commodity
Regulation. Appreciation is expressed to Kathleen Courtney for her assistance in preparation of
this Perspective.
I The London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE), the recently established
British financial futures market, trades futures on Eurodollars and the British "Long Gilt."
2 E.g., The London International Petroleum Exchange.
3 According to statements by promoters of a proposed Bermuda based exchange (Inter), the
Exchange intends to list, inter alia, futures contracts on United States Treasury Bonds.
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participation by United States residents.4 In turn, this has prompted
Congress to address more directly the phenomenon of United States
trading in such markets through recent amendments to United States
regulatory and tax laws. Both laws provide the Executive Branch-
primarily the Department of Treasury and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC)-with broad discretionary authority to
make determinations affecting United States trader access to foreign
markets, insofar as it is controlled or influenced by CFTC regulation
and United States tax law. Proceeding in accord with their separate
mandates, however, the two government entities have made little ap-
parent attempt to balance United States regulatory and taxing concerns
with an ongoing interest in international market centers, or to mesh
more closely existing regulatory and taxation standards. As a result,
the standards are somewhat divergent.
This Perspective highlights aspects of current law shaping the way
the federal government addresses foreign commodity markets and ex-
plores the interaction of these provisions with suggested predominant
United States' interests. It proposes some modest suggestions for bring-
ing existing trader protection and tax rules in line with the United
States' interests in individual investor freedom and a viable interna-
tional marketplace. Finally, in acknowledgment of the evolutionary
forces at work in both United States and foreign markets, this Perspec-
tive includes some thoughts regarding potential trends in the interna-
tional marketplace that could eventually encourage reassessment of the
pragmatism of relying on traditional forum-based national standards
for market regulation of international futures markets.
Before proceeding too far into the subject, however, it may be use-
ful to note what will quickly become apparent regarding the phenom-
ena discussed: the subject area confronts one with something of a
statistical wasteland. Accordingly, as time passes and Congress and
federal authorities address the topics discussed, there unquestionably
will be room for refinement of the views expressed here. Nonetheless, a
particular purpose is to highlight certain inconsistencies in existing law
in the hope that they eventually will be resolved by the adoption of
some standard, such as the parity standard suggested here.
The subject matter addressed in this Perspective concerns the trad-
ing of commodity futures (including instruments broadly defined as
"options") by United States interests on foreign commodity markets,
and the impact of domestic rules governing such trading on a greater
4 Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 45 (1982).
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international marketplace for pricing, hedging5 and, in some cases, the
acquisition of commodities.
II. ORIGINS OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN
REGULATION OF FOREIGN MARKET TRANSACTIONS
Until the last decade, the typical United States trader in foreign
commodity markets was a domestic branch of an international trade
house, an American merchant, a fabricator or processor dependent on
prices of commodities traded on those markets, or an international
arbitrageur6 belonging to the above trade classes or motivated to specu-
late in price variations between United States and foreign markets.
The usual focal point of such trading was London markets in "soft"
tropical commodities or in nonferrous metals.7
In contrast to many United States exchanges, London markets are
traditionally "trade" or merchant oriented without a large population
of independent floor brokers.' Accordingly, a higher percentage of
trades executed on the foreign market is attributable to commercial
hedging, as opposed to transactions of individual speculators. The in-
dependent origins and histories of established foreign exchanges, to-
gether with political variables in the country involved, have resulted in
a number of differences both in market form and in the scope and in-
tensity of government oversight as compared with the United States
5 Although reference to the specialized terms which stalk the commodity industry have been
rather ruthlessly pruned here, there are several survivors: "Hedging" implies taking a position in
a futures market opposite a position held in the cash market to minimize the risk and financial loss
from adverse price change, a purchase or sale of futures as a temporary substitute for a cash
transaction that will take place later. Glossary of Some Terms Commonly Used in the Commodity
Exchange Act, CFTC Publication No. 105 (Aug. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Glossary]. A "specu-
lator" is an individual who trades in commodity futures with the object of achieving profits
through the successful anticipation of price movements. Id
6 An international arbitrageur simultaneously buys in one market (e.g. New York) and sells
in another (e.g. London) to profit from price differences between the two. Such arbitraging activi-
ties play an important role in leveling out price differences between the two or more markets
involved.
7 International "soft" commodities (coffee, sugar, cocoa, etc.) are traded at "terminal" (e.g.
futures) markets grouped under the aegis of the London Commodity Exchange Co., Ltd (LCE).
LCE markets provide facilities for trading clearinghouse futures and options. Markets for nonfer-
rous metals (copper, zinc, silver, aluminum, lead) are made at The Metal Market and Exchange
Company, Ltd, or London Metal Exchange (LME). The LME is a principals market (inter alia, a
non clearinghouse market), and arguably, not a futures market at all, as that term is customarily
construed in the United States.
8 A popularly quoted statistic attributes 50% of all United States commodity market volume
to the activities of floor traders trading for their own account. See Selig, Regulation of Floor
Brokers and Floor Traders, in COMMODITIES AND SECURITIES REGUL.ATION: How DIFFERENT
... FOR How LONo? (A.B.A. COMM. ON COMMODITIES REG. 1982).
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model.9
As in United States markets, the normal medium of trading and
pricing in foreign commodity markets is not the actual commodity but
rather a contract to purchase or sell the commodity, commonly-but
not in all cases, accurately-equated with the United States concept of
a future, including instruments known as options. 10 These contracts
may be backed by a clearinghouse which serves a function similar to a
clearinghouse for United States markets. Unlike domestic markets,
however, the foreign market may utilize a principals contract where the
market member and the customers remain in direct contractual privity
with one another throughout the life of the position.
Until 1975, federal law regulated only markets trading futures on
certain identified domestic farm commodities.11 Trading in metals and
tropical commodities was unregulated-even if the trading was con-
ducted on a United States market. Thus, while the foreign market
trader domiciled in the United States was free to follow his own in-
stincts, he could not rely on a regulatory scheme to oversee the integrity
of the transaction or the qualifications of the broker with whom he was
dealing. If a dispute arose regarding the contract, it was resolved ac-
cording to foreign law, normally pursuant to arbitration at the foreign
exchange. 12
Due in part to a growing volume of trading in unregulated com-
modities and fraudulent enticements to unsophisticated public custom-
9" For a discussion of foreign market regulatory considerations, see Rock, Regulatory Control
Over the United States, Canadian and United Kingdom Futures Markets, 37 Bus. LAW. 613 (1982).
10 The termfutures contract (orfuture) is used here to describe generically an exchange-cre-
ated standardized contract to make or take delivery of a specified quantity of a commodity at
some time in the future. The standardized features of such contracts imply that one contract
differs from another only with respect to price and month of delivery and renders them capable of
satisfaction by offset. Following entry of an order (in clearinghouse markets) a clearinghouse is
substituted for the original exchange member as the "buyer to every seller and the seller to every
buyer." An option provides the purchaser with the right-but not, as in futures contracts, the
obligation--to make or take delivery of the commodity, or an underlying futures contract for the
commodity. For that right, the purchaser pays a premium. United States tax law treats futures or
options contracts as interests in personal property; the "formal" United States regulatory address
of a futures contract is "a contract of sale of a commodity for futures delivery." In the United
States such a contract may only be traded on a CFTC regulated commodity exchange. Options,
on the other hand, may be sold in a dealer market, as well as traded on an exchange. Few such
restrictions apply in foreign markets.
11 Generally, these include cattle, wheat, rice, corn, and numerous other U.S. farm commodi-
ties. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (1976).
12 For example, the rules governing the London Metal Exchange state in part, "In the event of
either party to the difference failing to appoint an arbitrator ... upon written or cable request of
either party an arbitrator shall be appointed from the Arbitration Panel by the Committee of the
London Metal Exchange." Part III, Arbitration Rule 3. Similar rules may be found in the rules of
many foreign (and United States exchanges), reflecting established merchant practice.
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ers, federal commodities law was amended in 1974 to bring all
commodities traded under stringent federal regulation. 13 As a result,
the foreign market speculator became a member of a class whose trans-
actions with commodity brokers were placed under oversight of the
newly created CFTC.14 Ultimately, rampant fraud and abuse caused
options-but not futures-positions on foreign markets to be banned in
the United States to all but a small class of trader interests.
15
Until recently, federal tax law generally did not distinguish be-
tween United States and foreign markets in assigning tax consequences
to commodity trading activities of United States taxpayers. In 1981,
however, Congress responded to the widespread marketing of tax
avoidance schemes based on futures trading (in both its United States
and foreign permutations) and substantially amended United States tax
law.'6 One effect of these changes was to differentiate for tax purposes
between foreign and domestic market speculative positions, compara-
tively penalizing the former.
Thus, within a seven year period the environment in the United
States for speculation in foreign markets changed considerably. Dur-
ing this period, foreign markets were responding to economic forces
similar to those driving United States markets to create new products to
service the needs of commercial interests operating in a volatile inter-
national economy.' 7 The resulting international product/instrument/
exchange mix is a unique assortment of major established markets and
new exchanges, with many variants.
At least thirty-four" such commodity markets currently exist
outside United States' jurisdiction, providing hedging and pricing facil-
ities for a variety of commodities. These markets include the London
exchange centers, traditional grain and produce exchanges on the Con-
13 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
14 Id
15 17 C.F.R. § 32.11(a) (1983).
16 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 501-509, 95 Stat. 172, 323-35
(1981).
17 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. One outgrowth of such expansionism is
planned "linkages" between international exchanges. As an example, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange recently announced an impending linkage with the Singapore Gold Exchange, and a
system which would potentially allow a trader to establish a position in Chicago and remove it in
Singapore, and vice versa. Other United States and foreign markets (e.g., COMEX (the New
York Metal Exchange) and the Sydney (Australia Futures Exchange) are considering similar
plans.
18 This is admittedly a "rough" count of futures markets and "futures-type" markets based on
data obtained from the United States Futures Industry Association. THE GUIDE TO WORLD COM-
MODITY MARKETS (John Paiiy 3rd ed. 1982) lists some 96 entities serving as markets or in market-
ing capacities.
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tinent, Japanese markets trading grains, oilseeds, cotton and such exot-
ica as dried silkworm cocoons, and other markets as proximate as
Canada and as distant as Australia. 9 For certain commodities and
contracts there are no counterpart markets in the United States, but for
others certain similarities in markets exist, although contract specifica-
tions and trading rules can vary substantially. Many markets are
strictly local. Although United States trading is a major factor for mar-
ket success in many markets, in others it is discouraged by local ex-
change control regulations or otherwise limited or nonexistent.
As will become apparent, a major objective of this Perspective is
not to agitate for a coherent federal policy toward the Toyohuashi
Dried (silkworm) Cocoon Exchange or similar localized markets. On
the other hand (albeit perhaps more chauvinistically), where the sub-
ject commodity is copper, lead, silver, tin, zinc and aluminum priced
and hedged on the London Metal Exchange, or rubber, sugar, cocoa or
coffee at a terminal market of the London Commodity Exchange, pe-
troleum,20 gold,21 United States grown crops, 22 and other commodi-
ties' increasingly being priced in the United States by futures trading,
the utility of a more studied policy regarding United States access to
such markets is more apparent.
III. UNITED STATES REGULATORY AND TAXING RULES APPLICABLE
TO TRADING ON FOREIGN MARKETS
Commodity traders operate subject to an amalgam of commercial
and financial restraints, but authority relevant to United States trader
participation in foreign markets is to be found particularly in the Com-
modity Exchange Act24 and certain provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.25 Although a detailed analysis of either Act is beyond the scope
of this Perspective, some appreciation as to how the two laws interact is
an appropriate point of departure for further discussion.
19 GUIDE TO WORLD COMMODrrY MARKETS, supra note 18.
20 Petroleum is traded in London.
21 Gold is traded in several foreign futures markets, most notably Hong Kong, Singapore, and
London.
22 These crops, which include flax, oats, and barley, are traded in Winnipeg, Manitoba,
Canada.
23 These include financial instruments.
24 Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1976)).
25 I.R.C. §§ 1092, 1256 (West Supp. 1983). See also Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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A. The United States Commodity Exchange Act
The focus of the Commodity Exchange Act is protection against
fraud and manipulation on domestic commodity markets.2 6 The Act is
the source of substantive regulation of all United States commodity ex-
changes and some 50,000 market professionals interacting with com-
modity customers, and is administered by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), an independent agency of the United
States government.27
Transactions regulated by the Commodity Exchange Act are gen-
erally those which involve standardized commodity offerings to the
public. Excluded from regulation are forward contracts28 and-with
some exceptions---"cash" or "physical" transactions.29 In the course of
six decades the Act's reach gradually has been expanded by Congress
to encompass an increasing number of individuals and exchanges in-
volved in the trading of futures and options.30
From its 1922 inception until 1975, the Act regulated futures and
options trading only in certain listed domestic agricultural commodi-
ties.3 ' For those commodities, Congress banned options in 1936,32
while regulated futures contracts were traded under the oversight of the
Department of Agriculture. As previously noted, United States ex-
changes, brokers and sales personnel involved in metals and interna-
26 This is consistent with the Act's 1921 origin as a document to combat the "evils" of com-
modity speculation, as perceived by agricultural producers and their elected representatives. For
one review of the origins of the Commodity Exchange Act see Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain
Gambler and his Successor, 6 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1 (1977), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1978). See also Stassen, The Commodity Exchange Act in Perspective: A Short
and Not So Reverent History of Futures Trading Legislation in the United States, 39 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 825 (1982). An overview of United States commodity regulation as it respects domestic
markets is provided in I JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION (1982), and discussed in Russo,
REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS (1983).
27 Individual states and territories are given authority to enforce certain provisions of the Act
in state courts, but in general are prohibited from imposing separate regulations on the commodity
marketplace. It should be noted that the 97th Congress provided a limited role for the Securities
Exchange Commission in regulating commodity pools and approving certain futures contracts
involving securities indices. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, §§ 101(3),
103(2), 96 Stat. 2294, 2296 (1983) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2, 4(g), 6(m) (1982)).
28 7 U.S.C. § 2a(i) (1982). Generally, the term "forward contract" describes a contract be-
tween buyer and seller to deliver a specialized quality and quantity of a commodity at a future
date.
29 The Act exempts routine commercial contracts (e.g. between a grain farmer and a grain
elevator) from regulation. A "cash," "spot," or "actual" transaction implies a simultaneous imme-
diate sale (payment for immediate possession). See 7 U.S.C. § 2, 2a (1982). Fraud in the sale of
an actual commodity or manipulation of cash prices may violate Section 4(b) of the Act. Com-
modity Exchange Act, § 4(b), 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1982).
30 See generally Rainbolt, supra note 26.
31 See Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922); 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) (1982).
32 Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, § 4c, 49 Stat. 1491-94 (1936).
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tional "soft" commodities remained essentially unregulated by the
federal government, and it has been alleged that Congress did not even
remotely consider foreign exchanges in addressing earlier manifesta-
tions of the Act.33 In 1974 Congress amended the Commodity Ex-
change Act to extend federal jurisdiction to any commodity that was
the subject of futures trading34 and in the wake of these amendments
the somewhat benign relationship that existed previously between
United States authority and foreign markets became a point of in-
creased regulatory tension.
1. CFTC Authority Over Foreign Futures Sales
When the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act extended
federal oversight over all commodities traded,35 a brief notation in the
Conference Report supported the proposition that the Act was in-
tended to address foreign as well as domestic markets. 36 Accordingly,
shortly after it commenced regulation in 1975, the CFTC promulgated
an antifraud rule applicable to foreign futures sales,37 but did little else
until 1981 when a CFTC Interpretive Letter concluded that United
States sales of foreign futures resulted in CFTC registrant status as a
"Commodity Trading Advisor."38 By 1982, however, the Commission,
apparently uncomfortable with regulatory authority over foreign fu-
tures derived almost solely from legislative history and staff opinion,
requested Congress to extend the Act to provide broad statutory au-
thority to the CFTC over United States persons involved in the sale of
foreign futures.39 This recommendation--to amend Section 4 of the
33 See Schroeder, CF'C Reauthorization: Some Possible Implications of Futures Trading on
Foreign Markets andfor Foreigners Trading on United States Markets, 1 J. FUTURES MARKETS
555-62 (Supp. 1981). See also 41 Fed. Reg. 26,606 (1976) (Retroactive interpretation that wool
options banned by 1954 Amendment to Commodity Exchange Act); [1975-77 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,175.
34 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-463, § 201, 88 Stat. 1389,
1395 (1974).
35 Id
36 " wish to emphasize that the words 'any other board of trade, exchange, or market' were
included in the conference substitute onlyfor the purpose of giving the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission jurisdiction overfutures contractspurchased or sold in the United States and executed on
aforeign board of trade, exchange, or market." (emphasis added) 120 CONG. Rnc. H10248 (daily
ed. Oct. 10, 1974) (remarks of Congressman Poage). Senate version at 120 CONG. REc. S34995
(daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974). (Remarks of Senator Talmadge). The statements were designed to as-
suage concerns of the Securities Exchange Commission that the terms cited might otherwise have
the effect of placing U.S. securities markets under CFTC regulation.
37 17 C.F.R. § 30.02 (1983).
38 CFTC Interpretive Letter 81-1 [1980-82 Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,244.
39 In its legislative request the CFTC sought to amend Section 4 of the Commodity Exchange
Act (7 U.S.C. § 6) as follows: Sec. 4(b)-'n addition to its existing authority, the Commission may
adopt rules andregulations governing the offer andsale by anyperson located in the United States, its
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Act-was incorporated into early drafts of the legislation then before
Congress. But in the face of opposition from foreign commodity ex-
changes and United States brokerage houses, the carte blanche nature
of the original CFTC proposal was amended to a more limited grant of
authority.40
The resulting amendment, enacted in January 1983, is the touch-
stone for the Commission's present regulatory authority over United
States sales of foreign futures. It authorizes the Commission to pro-
mulgate rules governing persons engaged in the "offer and sale of any
contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, that is made or is to
be made" on a foreign exchange.4" With respect to such contracts, the
CFTC is empowered to adopt rules and regulations proscribing fraud,
to require minimum financial standards, disclosure of risk to custom-
ers, filing of certain reports and recordkeeping, safeguarding of cus-
tomer funds, and registration with the Commission by persons located
in the United States, its territories or possessions.42 The 1983 amend-
territories orpossessions, of any contract of sale of a commodityforfuture delivery which is made or
to be made on a board of trade, exchange or market located outside the United States, its territories
orpossessions." S. 2109, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(b) (1981) (emphasis added).
40 As enacted, this provision, Section 4(b), now reads:
The Commission may adopt rules and regulations proscribing fraud and requiring minimum
financial standards, the disclosure of risk, the filing of reports, the keeping of books and
records, the safeguarding of customers' frauds, and registration with the Commission by any
person located in the United States, its territories or possessions, who engages in the offer or
sale of any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery that is made or is to be made
on or subject to the rules of a board of trade, exchange, or market located outside the United
States, its territories or possessions. Such rules and regulations may impose different require-
ments for such persons depending upon the particular foreign board of trade, exchange, or
market involved. No rule or regulation may be adopted by the Commission under this sub-
section that (1) requires Commission approval of any contract, rule, regulation, or action of
any foreign board of trade, exchange, or market, or clearinghouse for such board of trade,
exchange, or market, or (2) governs in any way any rule or contract term or action of any
foreign board of trade, exchange, or market, or clearinghouse for such board of trade, ex-
change, or market.
Commodity Exchange Act, § 4(b), 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1982). The CFTC also proposed a trouble-
some provision (S. 2109 § 20, supra note 34) where individual states could enforce any applicable
state law against non-United States exchange instruments. The simultaneous inclusion of Section
12(e) state jurisdiction and Section 4(b) federal jurisdiction over foreign futures was assumed to be
drafting error and the provision was subsequently amended to withhold the grant of state jurisdic-
tion over foreign markets unless the Commission deems otherwise. Commodity Exchange Act,
§ 12e, 7 U.S.C. § 17a (1982).
41 Id
42 For a more comprehensive review of the described amendment see Rainbolt, Commodity
Exchange Act Revisions Affecting Foreign Markets and Foreign Traders, Commodity Law Letter
(June 1983). It is apparent that the 97th Congress viewed any necessary regulatory address of
"legitimate" foreign commodity exchanges as a federal function, with state regulation reserved for
situations involving "the illicit offer and sale" to United States residents of foreign futures con-
tracts. Both sections 4(b) and 12(e) have curious origins, since no abuse--the fodder normally
demanded by Congress to enact changes in existing law-was cited by the CFTC to justify the
need for broader regulatory authority over sales practices involving foreign market positions. The
origin of these preventive provisions is possibly rooted in CFTC experience with other "loop-
Foreign Commodity Market Positions Regulation
5:462(1983)
ment also provides the CFTC with the authority to differentiate be-
tween foreign markets in adoption of such rules.43
The CFTC has yet to adopt regulations implementing its new au-
thority. Accordingly, foreign futures sales remain subject only to lim-
ited antifraud regulation, in contrast to domestic futures sales which
are subject to a host of regulatory measures, and foreign exchange op-
tions which remain generally banned from the United States market.44
2. CFTC Authority Over Foreign Options Sales
After 1974, the 1936 options ban remained intact only for certain
United States produced farm commodities, while the fate of the grow-
ing public market in options on the then newly regulated "interna-
tional" commodities was left to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission.45 This, in effect, made the Commission responsible for
regulating a burgeoning United States public market in "London" op-
tions and dealing with the various fraudulent schemes involving op-
tions guised as having originated on London commodity markets.
Although the Commission had proposed rules aimed toward regulation
of foreign exchange options, bringing options under a coherent regula-
tory policy proved too much for the Commission, and in 1978 the
CFTC, subsequently backed by Congress, banned all options sales to
the public, subject to some major exceptions.' The Commission, how-
ever, retained authority to eliminate the ban and to allow options sales
to the public under rules later to be adopted.47
Pursuant to that authority, the Commission proceeded in 1981 to
implement an earlier proposal to allow United States exchanges to list
and trade options on a "pilot program" basis.48 Subsequently, in 1983,
Congress altered the 1936 statutory ban to allow the CFTC to authorize
trading of options on farm commodities, which cleared the way for the
holes" in the Act and the suspected opportunity for miscreants to create fraudulent "offshore," as
opposed to "true" foreign exchanges. S. RPP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1981).
43 See supra note 32.
44 17 C.F.1L § 32.11 (1983).
45 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982). The commodities on which options remained statutorily banned
ranged from wheat and cotton to livestock and frozen concentrated orange juice.
46 Excepted were "trade" options where the purchaser is a "producer, processor, commercial
user of, or a merchant handling the commodity involved in the transaction or the products or by
products thereof." Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, § 3(c), 92 Stat. 865, 867
(1978); and public sales by certain well capitalized dealers (under statutory regulation) in the
business of granting options on May 1, 1978. Id § 3(d).
47 Unlike Commission authority over foreign futures sales, its regulatory authority over option
sales contains few restrictions. Although the Commission has the authority to remove foreign
options from the ban, it has not done so. Id § 3(d)(2).
48 Regulation of Domestic Exchange-Traded Commodity Options Transactions, 46 Fed. Reg.
54,500 (1981) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 33 (1983)).
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CFTC to authorize exchanges to list options on futures on those com-
modities as part of the pilot program.49 Foreign options and options
that might be written by most United States dealers are generally
banned, but United States exchange and certain other "dealer" options
are available to the general public under CFTC regulation.50 The
CFTC also has actively solicited public views as to allowing farm prod-
uct options to be traded on United States exchanges, 51 and such trading
may soon be legitimized as yet another CFTC "pilot" program.
B. Tax Law Application to Positions on Foreign Commodity
Markets
The other major source of federal authority applicable to com-
modity market positions is found in sections 1092 and 1256 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.52
Generally, United States tax law treats identified hedging positions
in commodities as a source of an ordinary gain or loss to the taxpayer 3
while a speculative position results in a capital gain or loss.
5 4
If the commodity position is entered into for commercial hedging
purposes, the law does not distinguish between transactions executed
on United States or foreign markets. Gain or loss resulting from trans-
actions on either market is treated as ordinary in character.
5
Tax law does distinguish, however, between markets with respect
to speculative positions. On United States markets, gain or loss result-
ing from speculative trading is taxed at a rate computed by allocating
to the trade a favorable gain/loss ratio of 60% as "long term" and 40%
"short term," (the "60/40" rule);56 while a speculative transaction on a
foreign exchange is taxed at a more costly "short term" gain rate,5 7
resulting in a maximum tax rate of 50%, unless the position is held a
minimum of six months,58 at which point the gain becomes long-term
(i.e., taxed at 20% marginal rates). The running of the six month hold-
ing period is denied, however, if the speculative position is offset by a
49 Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 206, 96 Stat. 2296 (1983). See also
CFTC Release No. 2085-84, Jan. 25, 1984, reprinted in 49 Fed. Reg. 2252 (1984).
50 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.19, 32, 33 (1983).
51 48 Fed. Reg. 46,797 (1983).
52 I.R.C. §§ 1092, 1256 (1982).
53 Id Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). Certain defined




56 I.R.C. § 1256(a) (1982).
57 Id
58 I.R.C. § 1222 (1982).
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position that substantially reduces the risk of loss from the first posi-
tion.5 9 Speculative arbitrage involving United States and foreign mar-
ket positions is subject to this "balanced position" rule.6°
Due to normal market volatility, only under exceptional circum-
stances will a trader be able to hold profitably a given "naked" foreign
market position for a sufficient period to take advantage of long-term
capital gains treatment. The speculative trader who resorts to offsetting
transactions to protect a market position triggers the holding period
suspension.6 Certain positions on foreign markets are also subject to
some fairly draconian requirements for proving claimed deductions
from transactions on those markets62 and are denied certain other ben-
efits (primarily certain loss carryback provisions) available to the tax-
payer for domestic market positions.63 Because the rule does not apply
to futures positions on a United States market, speculative futures posi-
tions on foreign markets are comparatively penalized by United States
tax law. Accordingly, the rank and file United States speculator is
probably better advised to make or lose money trading domestic rather
than foreign markets.
The Act also provides the Secretary of the Treasury with discre-
tionary authority to allow certain foreign market positions to be taxed
under the "60/40" rule and other provisions governing United States
market positions.' In effect, exercising this discretion would largely
equalize tax treatment between speculative foreign and United States
market positions, 65 however, Section 1256 treatment has yet to be
granted to positions involving any foreign market and an attempt to
encourage Congress to rewrite existing law to compel such treatment
enlisted little support as an amendment to a "Technical Corrections
Bill" considered by Congress in late 1982.66
59 I.R.C. § 1092(c)(1), (2) (1982).
60 I.R.C. § 1092(c)(2) (1982).
61 I.R.C. § 1092 (1982).
62 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 337, 96 Stat. 324
(1982).
63 I.R.C. § 1212(c) (1982).
64 I.R.C. § 1256(b)(3) (1982).
65 Id The Act may focus such treatment on foreign markets which follow clearing practices
identical to United States commodity markets, e.g. a clearinghouse which "marks the position to
market" daily. If so, a possible effect of this requirement is to discourage "60/40" treatment for
positions on the LME and other principals markets.
66 Congress did extend mark to market treatment to Foreign Exchange (FOREX) interbank
trading by the Technical Corrections Bill of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365 (1982). Press
accounts indicate the Chicago Mercantile Exchange will seek such treatment respecting its pro-
posed linkage with the Monetary Exchange of Singapore, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1984, at 43, col. 3
(Midwest ed.).
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C. Assessment of Current Policy
At least three questions might be legitimately raised regarding the
compendium of regulatory and taxing rules described: (1) do the rules
realistically reflect the United States interest in the markets described;
(2) are realistic restrictions imposed on United States traders; (3) do the
rules provide essential protections expected by the public?
From the discussion thus far it will be apparent that United States
law supplies fairly potent regulatory and tax incentives for the specula-
tive commodity trader to trade only on United States markets, although
some confusion is exhibited as to the thrust of the underlying policy
behind the same rules.
For example, speculative traders, domestic exchanges, and foreign
markets each may have some gripe against United States requirements
relevant to foreign market speculation. United States exchanges and
brokerage houses might look askance at the disparate regulatory bur-
den placed on commodity professionals handling domestic futures con-
tracts, compared with requirements governing foreign futures sales.
Tax penalties imposed on speculation in foreign markets and the
CFTC's ban on foreign exchange options obviously disadvantage for-
eign markets. A United States speculator is provided no real United
States supervision over his foreign market futures orders, is affected by
the ban on foreign option positions traded on the same foreign market
and is subjected to punitive tax treatment of gain and loss arising from
those positions he nevertheless maintains on a foreign market. The tax
penalties imposed on speculative arbitrage transactions may have the
distinction of being a potential irritant to each of the named groups.67
Although shedding tears over the plight of the foreign market
speculator probably ranks as a lesser government priority, there may be
something more to be said about the application of existing law than its
effect on the individual commodity trader.
Given the substantial role of international commodity markets in
facilitating commerce, the potential effect of constricting speculative
order flow to foreign markets is arguably broader than its singular ef-
67 A side-effect of United States tax policy-the deterrence of arbitrage against United States
and foreign markets-would seem to suggest a certain conclusion regarding the balance between
United States and foreign prices of the commodities involved, that the balance may be more
dependent upon the activities of a concentrated group of larger concerns arbitraging in conformity
with certain technical requirements of United States law in regard to hedging treatment, than a
more diverse range of professional traders whose vocational niche does not allow them to take
ordinary gain and loss as a result of their transactions, or otherwise avail themselves of "mark to
market" gain rates for both sides of the arbitrage transaction. In other words, a potential side
effect of the rules discussed concentrates market leveling activities (perhaps limited only to some
markets) to a very limited number of commercial concerns.
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fect on the relatively limited number of direct users of the same mar-
kets. 8 Effective hedging depends upon speculation. 69 The absence of
outside speculative orders flowing to a foreign exchange may result in
erratic pricing and a market unable to attract or assimilate large com-
mercial hedging orders. A newly established market may be hampered
from developing into a more stable entity.
To the extent that United States law frustrates speculation in for-
eign markets by a substantial pool of United States traders, it also de-
ters liquidity in such markets, which in turn affects the utility of the
market and results in a less efficient marketplace.7" The impact of
these inefficiencies-including higher prices-is presumably passed on
to the United States economy and its foreign counterparts.7 '
It is unlikely that the commercial trade orientation of the major
foreign exchanges renders them totally immune from the phenomena
just discussed. The success of any market is contingent upon attracting
sufficient speculative interest to provide an opposing view when com-
mercial interests are either pessimistic or optimistic, which allows trad-
ers to hedge without distorting price trends away from movements in
the physical market.72
68 Gray, The Importance of Hedging in Futures Trading, and the Effectiveness of Futures Trad-
ing in Hedging, in 3 READINGS IN FUTURES MARKETS 223 (1980).
69 See infra note 73 and accompanying text. See also, Working, Economic Functions ofFuures
Markets in FUTuRES TRADING IN LIvESTOCK: ORIGINS AND CONCEPTS (H. Baaken ed.) (1970),
reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF HOLBROOK WORKING (A. Peck ed. 1978).
70 "The Commission [CFTC] believes that providing market access to as many participants as
possible allows commodities traded on domestic exchanges to reflect more accurately international
supply and demand factors and provides additional market liquidity thereby facilitating the price
discovery function of United States futures exchanges." 47 Fed. Reg. 44,998 (1982) (emphasis
added) [1980-82 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,489, at 26,258.
71 On these points (with respect to United States markets), see studies compiled in 2 SELECTED
WRITINGS ON FuTuRas MARKETS 151-237 (Peck ed. 1977) and SELECTED WRITINGS OF HOL-
BROOK WORKING (Peck ed. 1978).
72 See REES, BRITAIN'S COMMODITY MARKETS 443-44 (1972):
Traders use futures markets in order to protect their profit margins from being eroded by
price fluctuations; in principle, hedging enables them to do this at the expense of also denying
them the possibility of achieving windfall gains from price changes. (For example, if a trader
holds stocks and hedges against a fall in price by selling futures, a rise in price will result in a
gain from sales in the delivery market, and an offsetting loss in the futures market.) While
traders seek to avert risks arising from price fluctuations, speculators are the market operators
who are prepared to assume these risks in the hope of making gains. Thus, because there is
unlikely to be a balance between hedgers on the short and on the long side of the market,
terminal markets cannot do without speculators. Furthermore, these financial interests
broaden markets which would otherwise be extremely thin and so register distorted prices.
(On some very active futures markets the turnover is often many times the volume of the
physical trade in the commodity over the same period.) The usefulness of speculative activ-
ity, provided it is kept under supervision by the market authorities concerned, is thus clear
enough. To the extent that traders hedge with one another or with speculators, the uncer-
tainty due to price fluctuations is removed from the trade and borne by financial interests.
The pursuit of gain by commodity speculators thus provides a useful economic service in
transferring price risks from those who do not wish to bear them to those who do. A market
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While United States law clearly restricts this function, the collec-
tion of rules discussed also reflects a certain bedrock of hard political
reality: government presumably will collect taxes from taxpayers who
make money trading commodities, and after several decades of protect-
ing United States speculators from fraud, it is unlikely that the govern-
ment will now abandon them as a protected class. Accordingly, one
suspects that if a case is to be made for a practical alternative to these
present rules, it should serve similar ends.
IV. A SUGGESTED UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD FOREIGN
MARKET TRANSACTIONS
A. Considerations
The preceding discussion does not necessarily imply that an im-
proved policy-taxing authority aside-must involve comprehensive
governmental oversight. The long history of self-regulation practiced
by established British markets, the availability of experienced dispute
resolution machinery (exchange arbitration and private litigation) and
recent developments in the United Kingdom and elsewhere indicating
a growing awareness that public traders have a legitimate expectation
of fair treatment by market professionals handling their orders,73 col-
lectively offer support for questioning the need today for any overt
United States regulation of foreign market sales practices.
in prices-which, in essence, is the purpose of futures trading-is thus ultimately beneficial to
society because traders are enabled through its use to charge lower prices. In other words,
traders would require higher margins in the absence of futures markets because of the greater
risk of losses entailed by fluctuating prices. The greatest fallacy is to believe that the elimina-
tion of speculative markets would abolish speculation, when in reality it would merely shift
the incidence onto other shoulders. When, for example, the State imposes an organization
(such as the post-war Raw Cotton Commission) into the channel of distribution which ab-
sorbs price changes, it, in effect, assigns to the taxpayer the role of risk bearer for the trade
concerned. Where no market or institution acts as the risk bearer for price changes, the
trader himself perforce assumes the role of speculator. Viewed in this light, therefore, the
speculator is a middleman who provides insurance against the risk of price fluctuations. His
operations on markets in prices thus expedite the passage of the good to the ultimate con-
sumer in a way which is no different, in principle, from that of other middlemen, be they
bankers, insurance companies, acceptance houses, warehouse-keepers or shipping agents.
REES, BRITAIN'S COMMODITY MARKETS 443-44 (1972).
73 For a discussion of British regulation, see Rock, supra note 9. British exchanges are estab-
lishing a self-regulatory organization, the Futures Brokers Association, and certain guarantee
funds in the event of brokerage house failure. SECURITIES WEEK, Oct. 3, 1983, at 9. See, e.g.,
Review of Investor Protection Report (Part I) ("Report presented to Parliament by the Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry by Command of Her Majesty," January 1984). The Report rec-
ommends overhaul of certain investor protection standards in Britain with stronger standards to
be enforced by certain established self-regulatory entities recognized by the British government.
Similarly, British commodity market leaders have moved to establish a new self-regulatory organ-
ization (the Association of Future Brokers and Dealers). Various commodity markets are creating
special "guarantee funds" to provide a source of compensation for small investors potentially
aggrieved under existing law.
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To this question history suggests two responses depending on
whether the beneficiary of such activities is the public or a commercial
entity. The self-regulatory activities mentioned above apparently have
been sufficient to protect the reputation of the British marketplace as a
major forum for pricing and hedging and have attracted little criticism
as mechanisms of merchant regulation governing the trading activities
of market professionals. Nonetheless, in analogous circumstances these
same mechanisms failed as a useful regulatory presence when alleged
foreign options were being sold to unsophisticated United States public
customers, and the issue was protection of the United States investor.
Accordingly, proposing self-regulation of various foreign markets (or
source regulation by foreign governments) as an adequate antifraud
substitute for United States regulation encounters a historical obstacle
that may prove insurmountable.74 An easier task may be debating the
question of the degree of United States government regulation neces-
sary to protect identified United States interests, and whether the
source of that regulation is to be federal or state authority, a question
Congress has rather consistently answered in favor of the former.75
Once one capitulates to the argument for some form of govern-
ment regulation, secondary issues arise that relate to both the degree
and application of regulation. As to degree, a necessary caution in ap-
plication of any proposed government regulatory presence relates to
the nature of organized commodity markets outside the United States.
As noted previously, United States law limits futures trading to organ-
ized exchanges during stated trading hours. At foreign exchanges,
traded futures may be only a tip of the totality of commodity related
transactions oriented around the marketplace. Thus, a host of spot and
forward transactions-whether through members of exchanges or non-
members-are also available to a customer. Because these latter trans-
actions are rarely regulated in any form, a suggested overall goal is to
74 Additional points that suggest this conclusion are: (1) recourse to private litigation is not
usually cost effective when the amounts at stake are small (for example, less than $15,000) (this is
even more the case when litigation involves recourse to foreign law and foreign courts); (2) perpe-
trators of commodity fraud in the United States have demonstrated amazing adeptness at legal
combat and moving funds out of reach of customers; and (3) foreign arbitration is rarely a remedy
for customer fraud involved in the United States solicitation of an order.
75 Another answer may be warranted if, instead of a customer protection question, the issue is
a United States interest in well ordered foreign markets, free of manipulation. As the United
States has little or no jurisdiction to extend its anti-manipulative presence to encompass foreign
market practices, United States traders must remain solely dependent on the regulatory oversight
represented by the foreign government, by the foreign markets, or a combination. This reliance is,
of course, shared by traders of both consuming and producing nations. Fortunately, the fact that
certain foreign markets are well used by commercial interests probably attests to the effectiveness
of the marketplace in policing itself for such purposes.
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avoid the creation of a United States regulatory presence which penal-
izes legitimate firm dealings with United States customers, in effect
"squeezing" both parties into an amorphous world of "forward" and
"spot" commodity transactions not regulated by the Commodity Ex-
change Act. The temptation to further expand CFTC powers to bring
regulatory "order" to such a world is probably flirting with the regula-
tory equivalent of a cosmic "black hole," swallowing government re-
sources without resultant public benefit.
As to application, certain foreign governments ban citizens from
trading on foreign commodity markets. Because these edicts disadvan-
tage both United States markets and their users, a temptation might be
to permit United States trader access to foreign markets only on a re-
ciprocal basis. In large part, however, such foreign restrictions are
based on exchange control considerations, and if a beneficiary of open
access to foreign markets is the American economy, reciprocity is
pointing the regulatory finger in the wrong direction. Of course, "true"
reciprocity could also result in the engrafting of a morass of foreign
standards and restrictions onto the already complex regulatory envi-
ronment governing United States commodity firms-again probably
nullifying any realistic benefit the principle otherwise provides.
In the name of customer protection, government has three alterna-
tives: it can regulate, it can ban, or it can simply do nothing (the latter
proposal relies almost singularly on competition as a curative). As has
been noted, present law does all three, to the detriment of customers
and informational markets which suggests some need for a principle to
harmonize the various United States regulatory and taxing interests
discussed with a certain dependence on viable international markets.
One need not look far for such a principle. Several statements em-
anating from the CFTC in recent years describe a goal of United States
regulations imposed on United States and foreign traders (in United
States markets) as invoking the principle of "parity" of regulatory
treatment.76 Because the parity concept implies fairness and uniformity
in regulatory treatment-principles rather absent from existing rules-
it seems reasonable that such a standard might have equal validity
when applied to United States regulatory and tax requirements gov-
erning United States traders in foreign markets.
B. Achieving Regulatory and Tax Parity Between Foreign and
Domestic Markets
To explore how a rough system of parity might be achieved within
76 CFTC Release No. 177-76 (Aug. 4, 1976), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 30,426 (1980).
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the existing statutory framework, three adjustments to existing regula-
tory or tax rules governing foreign commodity market positions are
suggested.
1. Eliminate the Foreign Options Ban
The foreign options ban was the result of a set of circumstances
that overwhelmed the agency in its efforts to bring under regulation an
unregulated situation--the commodity options market in the United
States prior to 1973.77 As a result, present policy allows a public trader
unrestricted, essentially unregulated exposure and access to foreign fu-
tures positions, yet bars sales of a similar market instrument-an op-
tion-traded on the same exchange.78
Several contemporary factors support again allowing a restricted
offering of legitimate foreign exchange options into the United States
public marketplace; these include the recent initiation of a pilot pro-
gram of United States exchange traded options on a broad spectrum of
commodities, 79 the recent statutory repeal of the long-standing 1936
ban on agricultural options, and the continued existence-apparently
without regulatory disaster-of a small group of United States dealers
writing options for sale to the public under regulatory monopoly. 0 If
one assumes that the regulatory values supporting the composition of
the current United States options marketplace are a result of the pre-
sumed economic utility of options trading, fairness standards, and
some acknowledgement that potential purchasers may be presumed to
share some responsibility for their own investment decisions, and if one
also assumes that certain fundamental customer protection standards
can be met, there appears little reason why foreign commodity ex-
change options could not be freed from their present status as someth-
ing fit only for an elite priesthood of commercial traders.
As noted, the CFTC has authority to repeal the foreign options
ban and promulgate separate regulatory standards governing United
States sales practices."' In acknowledgement of the history of customer
77 Seesu.pra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. In addition to customer gullibility, a gener-
ally overlooked contribution to the customer protection problems facing the CFTC in the 1975-
1978 period (when fraud problems involving sales of so-called "London" options sales were at
their peak) was that certain tax advisors at the time were promoting the use of foreign options as a
tax shelter device. A manifestation of that market sector is litigation before the United States Tax
Court consolidating over 1400 IRS challenges to 1975-1977 taxpayer returns which claimed cer-
tain tax benefits as a result of London option transactions.
78 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.19, 32, 33 (1983).
79 Id
80 Id
81 Commodity Exchange Act, § 4c(b), 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982).
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protection problems associated with foreign options, such sales should
be subject to some sort of regulatory framework, perhaps such as Con-
gress has authorized to govern foreign futures sales. 2 Additional spe-
cial restrictions, perhaps limiting United States sales to vendors
regulated by the National Futures Association,83 and/or restricting eli-
gible option writers to foreign exchange members, or any of several
rules earlier proposed by the Commission to bring foreign exchange
options "in from the cold" might have merit as a guide for CFTC regu-
lations in this area.
2. Invoke Realistic Regulations Governing the Sale of Foreign Futures
in the United States
It was noted earlier that prior to passage of the Futures Trading
Act of 1982, a United States firm handling foreign futures positions for
United States customers was subject to registration with the CFTC as a
"Commodity Trading Advisor,"84 but the 1982 Act essentially elimi-
nated this requirement for United States firms that solely handled for-
eign futures, in favor of new powers granted to the Commission under
Section 4(b) of current law.85 Because the CFTC has not exercised its
Section 4(b) powers, the elimination of the registration requirement has
created a partial loophole that disadvantages public customers, United
States exchanges, as well as, arguably, the reputation in the United
States of established foreign exchanges.
Suggested regulatory measures in this area include requiring
CFTC registration for United States firms or individuals involved in
handling United States orders in foreign markets, adopting a standard
disclosure statement to alert speculators that they are not dealing in
United States markets but rather in markets governed by foreign law
where practices and principles may not be compatible with United
States law, imposing certain recordkeeping requirements to permit the
82 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
83 The National Futures Association (NFA) is a statutorily authorized United States commod-
ity industry self-regulatory association. The CFTC has approved the Charter and rules of the
NFA pursuant to Section 17(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1982).
84 See supra note 26. The Trading Advisor registration requirement provided a regulatory
"hook" to the CFTC to oversee activities of United States professionals involved, inter alia, solely
in foreign futures sales. In all likelihood, however, the preponderance of such sales were made
through other CFTC registrants, such as large commodity brokerage houses (already registered
with the CFTC as "Futures Commission Merchants") or through "Commodity Pool Operators."
85 The amendment still allows the Commission to include within the Commodity Trading
Advisor definition, persons advising "as to the value of commodities." As this was the language of
the previous definition, the Commission could presumably still resurrect its earlier interpretations
and reincorporate foreign sales firms within the new definition. Commodity Exchange Act,
§ 2(a)(l)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
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Commission to determine whether customer orders and customer funds
are being correctly handled, and amending the CFTC antifraud stan-
dards already extant.8 6 Each of the suggested regulatory requirements
is possible within the scope of the CFTC's new powers and, therefore,
probably would not involve recourse to statutory amendment. 87
3. Eliminate the Disparate Tax Treatment Between Foreign and
Domestic Market Positions
A key factor affecting futures trading is treatment by United States
tax law. It is apparent that one effect of the recent tax law changes has
been to create separate tax standards for United States and foreign ex-
change positions, toward questionable ends. While adjustment in cer-
tain accounting practices might be appropriate if a position emanates
from a foreign exchange that does not clear transactions on a techni-
cally "pure" mark to market system, it is questionable whether govern-
ment-erected barriers to foreign commodity market speculation and
arbitrage should be more than those minimally necessary to obtain rea-
sonable compliance with the tax laws. As noted, Section 1256 of the
Internal Revenue Code now authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
allow gains and losses derived from certain foreign commodity ex-
change positions to be taxed like domestic futures contracts, thus equal-
izing treatment of speculative positions in both markets. 88 As also
noted, Congress has recently extended "60/40" treatment to certain
foreign exchange (FOREX) dealings (nonclearinghouse principal
transactions)89 and the Treasury Department has recommended that
exchange traded commodity options on United States futures contracts
86 In adopting the provisions related to regulation of foreign exchanges, the House and Senate
Committees also adopted fairly stringent provisions restricting use of CFTC authority to interfere
with foreign market operations and contracts. It is abundantly clear from the language of Section
4(b) and from legislative history that, unlike CFTC authority over foreign options trading, the
CFTC has no authority to ban United States sales of foreign futures. Commodity Exchange Act,
§ 4(b), 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982); S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. - (1982); H.R. REP. No. 565,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3871-4022. With respect
to the existing CFTC antifraud regulations one could argue that the particular wording of the
regulation (17 C.F.R. § 30.02 (1983)) limits its application to transactions that occur on-as op-
posed to "on or subject to the rules o "--a given foreign exchange, thus limiting its utility when
applied against "Kerb" and other after market trading activity--that also occurs in conjunction
with established foreign markets.
87 An alternative approach would be to resurrect the inclusion of foreign future sales within
the ambit of the Commodity Trading Advisor definition. See supra note 85.
88 It is not completely clear whether foreign clearinghouses would be required to change the
manner of "marking positions to market" at the foreign exchange to comport with practices at
United States exchanges. See supra note 46-47 and accompanying text.
89 Technical Corrections Tax Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365 (1982). (Amend-
ments related to Title V of Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 105(a)(4) (1981)).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:462(1983)
also be taxed at 60/40 rates, although the Department has vacillated
somewhat on the subject.90 While a technical correction to the statute
may be in order if established foreign markets cannot be accorded Sec-
tion 1256 treatment under existing law, most of the principles that justi-
fied assisting FOREX traders-who also do not technically mark
positions "to market"-would seem applicable here.
C. Suggested Effect of Proposed Changes
The recommendations suggested differ from current United States
rules in several respects, but each is oriented toward the theme of en-
hancing the foreign marketplace for United States customers without a
resultant negative impact on United States customer protection stan-
dards or tax policy.
One effect of such proposals arguably would be partially to trans-
mute unregulated foreign commodity markets into public markets, per-
haps at the expense of United States exchange business or the interests
of United States customers. In reality, the goals of the actions sug-
gested are more modest: first, to more closely integrate the regulatory
and tax treatment of a relatively complex area to comport with legisla-
tive pronouncements made by Congress; and second, to acknowledge a
rather elementary principle-that United States and foreign markets
are each components of a larger international marketplace, and as
such, may be governed by the same "parity" principle now governing
policy respecting incoming foreign orders to United States markets.
The beneficial effects of such a policy are projected as follows:
(1) to stimulate and broaden the arbitrage base between United States
and foreign markets to the benefit of the price discovery and hedging
functions in both United States and foreign markets, (2) to allow
United States noncommercial traders to employ additional trading ve-
hicles to assist in their speculative ventures, (3) to stimulate liquidity
and price discovery in foreign markets, admittedly with some view to-
ward commodities traded on foreign markets but not presently avail-
able at United States markets, (4) to place the United States
government in the position of encouraging the free flow of commodity
90 That is, in November 1983 the Treasury Department supported extending R.F.C. treatment
to commodity options, Statement of John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Depart-
ment of the Treasury, Before the Committee on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Representatives,
Nov. 2, 1983; but the Department reversed itself in February out of concern for the effect of the
proposal on U.S. markets for listed stock options. See, e.g., "Summary of Administration Reve-
nue Proposals in the FY 1985 Budget Proposal," Joint Comm. on Taxation, U.S. Congress, Feb. 3,
1984. At this writing, Congress appears to be en route to adopting Treasury's initial proposal.
See, e.g., H.R. 4170, § 102, 98th Congress, 2d Sess., Mar. 5, 1984 (Comm. Print Substitute). See
also S.2370, Feb. 29, 1984.
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orders to the United States, as well as to foreign markets, and finally,
(5) to provide more adequate customer protection than currently exists.
In the same context, the negative aspects of such changes would
not have a terrible impact on the status quo; there should be no great
hemorrhage of the national Treasury nor increased abuse of the public
trader. Perhaps on a given day a speculative trader would lose (or
make) more money than at present, but, a certain currency risk (in
some markets) aside, whether a trader wins or loses in the marketplace
is rarely a function of the nationality of an established market. Instead,
it is a function of those universal factors that determine successful trad-
ers everywhere.
V. CLOSING THOUGHTS-WHO REGULATES THE "EXCHANGE" OF
THE FUTURE?
While the changes proposed might cure some ils attributed to cur-
rent law and current markets, one cannot, in candor, fail to note certain
ragged edges to the otherwise tidy character of the recommendations
mentioned,9" or more importantly, the existence of potential interna-
tional trends in central market mechanisms which could necessitate a
more wholesale reassessment of the relationship between national gov-
ernments and markets.
One such trend relates to the relationship between United States
and foreign exchanges: although the relationship arguably may be
largely symbiotic, in practice, markets often compete for customer
orders.
In this context, the process of obtaining United States government
permission to list a contract for trading on a United States exchange is
often complex and time consuming and grows increasingly expensive
as exchanges are required to pay for the CFTC's services in approving
the proposed contract for trading.92 Costs associated with the construc-
tion and promotion of proposed futures contracts may be high. Ex-
change and National Futures Association transaction costs, passed
inevitably to the economy, if not to the customer, represent cost factors
often peculiar to United States markets. Comprehensive CFTC over-
sight of exchanges and professionals can be an expensive irritant. The
91 This includes the role and relationship of principals markets to current United States law.
There are several uncertainties in interpretation of current tax law respecting options positions
both as to how taxed and whether (and when) an option is deemed to offset futures positions for
purposes of Section 1092 of the Internal Revenue Code.
92 Pub. L. No. 97-444 amends Section 26(c) of The Futures Trading Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 377)
to authorize the CFTC to impose service fees on United States exchanges for CFTC approval of
proposed futures contracts. 48 Fed. Reg. 38,214 (1983).
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United States commodity industry, in sum, seems more pervasively
regulated by the government than is the international norm. 3
This scenario does create a potential breeding ground for the prop-
agation of entrepreneur "offshore" United States exchanges regulated
loosely or not at all by the host government. The contracts offered by
such an exchange might consist of contracts already offered by United
States or other markets. Although evidence that such a market was
diverting orders from United States markets could result in pressures to
relax the United States regulatory presence in domestic markets, an
equally likely reaction could be the erection of additional regulatory
barriers against outside markets. If so, there would be an accompany-
ing need to define more closely the offshore target for regulatory pur-
poses to avoid subjecting established market centers to inordinate
United States regulatory requirements.
An intriguing issue involves the true locus of foreign markets for
regulatory and jurisdictional purposes. If one keeps in mind that trad-
ing of futures away from exchange floors is common and legal in many
foreign jurisdictions, the forum question becomes difficult to manage
when a network of international traders ("members" of the "ex-
change") are linked both to the site of the order execution machinery-
the exchange-as well as to one another in a dealer network. In such
markets the choice may exist of either positioning or executing cus-
tomer orders among members or passing them to the central market.
Although the law probably will adopt the situs of the trading floor as
the basis for asserting regulatory jurisdiction over the market, applica-
tion of this theory in the United States easily might be questioned if all,
or a preponderance, of the members of such a market are United States
entities.
Similarly, possible challenge to accepted precepts is found in the
potential for proposed international linkage systems between markets.
The motivating force behind such experiments is not necessarily to es-
cape United States regulation, but rather to extend trading hours by
pursuit of common contracts and clearing mechanisms at more than
one exchange, allowing a contract position established in Chicago to be
closed out in Singapore. Such systems raise jurisdictional questions,
depending upon the particular arrangement contemplated. "Linkage"
of a Far Eastern market with a United States market, for example (per-
haps with a clearinghouse located in either jurisdiction or in a third
93 Because there are also significant advantages to CFTC regulation, the relationship between
the CFTC and U.S. commodity exchanges is not necessarily antagonistic, where certain "big pic-
ture" (e.g. jurisdictional) issues are at stake.
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locale), would seem to pose jurisdictional issues similar to those already
noted relating to the locus of the market.
Present strides in technology probably already have eliminated a
presumed traditional requirement respecting exchanges, the assump-
tion that marketplaces inevitably require the actual presence of a gov-
erning body at a given trading center. With diffusion of the traditional
commodity marketplace, accompanying jurisdictional questions could
involve issues such as whether the situs of the exchange should con-
tinue to be a determinative jurisdictional consideration, or, assuming
the likely continuance of some degree of forum-based regulation over
markets, whether the significance of national standards arguably
should diminish to be replaced, if at all, by international standards.
While forum-based government regulation for customer protec-
tion purposes is probably destined to continue to be the United States
norm for some time into the future,9a one suspects that the current
United States system, involving reliance on government in effect to
"second-guess" and backstop the day-to-day anti-manipulative activi-
ties of exchanges, may be found wanting as markets increasingly be-
come forum independent. In such a circumstance, choices might
involve, on the one hand, an international regulatory presence-per-
haps some sort of an "international CFTC"-or continuation of tradi-
tional market self-regulation as the major anti-manipulative presence.
An uncertain United States regulatory situation with respect to its
domestic markets has already fostered several studies and calls95 for a
more precise United States policy toward futures trading in its several
manifestations. It seems rather clear that any such policy which might
be developed must address the phenomena of foreign markets, particu-
larly if (as one suspects), the distinction between United States and for-
eign markets is subject to increasing erosion.
In function many of today's markets realistically may be argued to
be beyond the sole claim of any nation, belonging instead to interna-
tional commerce. Regulation of access to such markets accordingly
should not be approached on the basis of a "we" versus "them" regula-
tory mentality, but rather along the lines suggested to facilitate a policy
that acknowledges the reality that United States and foreign markets
are both components of a larger international marketplace.
94 Depending on the success of an organization such as NFA, the CFTC presence could
shrink drastically during the same period.
95 See, e.g., Robert K. Wilmouth, President and Chief Officer, National Futures Association,
Remarks of the Conference on the Futures Markets and National Policy: An Agenda for the
1980's, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 5, 1983).
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